Congressional Ambivalence: The Political Burdens of Constitutional Authority by Jasmine Farrier

Author:Jasmine Farrier [Farrier, Jasmine]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Legislative Branch, History & Theory, National, Political Science, American Government
ISBN: 9780813139692
Google: IgN5MsLG24AC
Goodreads: 16440287
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
Published: 2010-04-30T07:40:07+00:00

2000s: Ambivalence before and after 9/11

President George W. Bush's first State of the Union address in 2001 requested fast-track renewal, which he called “trade promotion authority” (TPA), for a variety of brewing multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements. Under this administration, centrist Democrats changed sides. Although over one hundred Democrats joined the NAFTA House majority, the less significant Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), for example, got only fifteen Democratic votes in the House twelve years later. There are many possible explanations for this switch, including the Bush administration's legislative pressures, the Republican leadership's floor tactics in the House, and open questioning on the floors of both chambers about whether all the free trade agreements have helped or hurt the national economic outlook from corporate, regional, labor, and consumer perspectives. It seems clear also that the Democrats simply wanted to deny power to President Bush, especially during the 2005 CAFTA round and the 2007 issue of renewing fast track.48 Yet, in 2002, fast track was renewed, but not with the enthusiasm seen in the 1970s and 1980s.

Of course, the 2002 vote was complicated not only by high levels of partisanship but also by new pressures to delegate power in the ubiquitous shadow of 9/11. In fact, the high-profile act establishing the Department of Homeland Security was passed immediately before the final conference bill on trade. On the floor, proponents of the bill argued that the president was in a unique position to advocate for U.S. interests abroad. Yet many of these arguments also acknowledged the sacrifice of institutional and constitutional prerogatives of members on trade and pointed out that such losses were balanced by new and old restraints on the president to protect districts, including a new consulting timetable and a congressional oversight group. Opponents argued that these new protections for members were nothing of the sort and that more powerful possible arrangements had been gutted from the final bill, such as the traditional gatekeeping powers of the Finance and Ways and Means committees seen in previous versions of fast track. In the end, the conference report removed an amendment by Senators Dayton (D-MN) and Craig (R-ID) that would allow amendments to fast-track consideration.

In the 2002 legislation, the president had to notify Congress ninety days in advance that he intended to enter into negotiations for a new trade accord. On this point, Representative Sander Levin (D-MI) said, “They built up this facade that Congress is going to be involved. It is consultation at the whim of the administration. They say there is a sense of Congress, that that can be expressed. It undoes the only protection we now have that something can come through the Committee on Ways and Means or the Committee on Finance. We need, in this Congress, to be a partner, not a second-class citizen. If we remain that way, the citizens of the United States are going to be undermined by the executive of this country.” Those in favor of the bill argued that the president needs the authority but that Congress would be kept in the loop.

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